United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

ORIGINAL 76-5029

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 76-5029

In the Matter

of

INTERSTATE STORES, INC., formerly known as INTERSTATE DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Debtor-Appellees.

DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS, INC.,

Appellant,

JOHN E. HANCOCK and AMF INCORPORATED, Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT APPENDIX

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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

THE ORDER OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGE RYAN DATED 9/14/76

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re

INTERSTATE STORES, INC., formerly : known as INTERSTATE DEPARTMENT

STORES, INC., et al.,

Debtors.

Reorganization
Nos. 74 B 614-802
Inclusive

ORDER

At New York, New York, in said District on the 141-day of September, 1976

This cause having come on to be heard on September 10, 1976, upon the application of JOSEPH R. CROWLEY and HERBERT B. SIEGEL, Trustees of the debtors herein (the "Trustees"), for an order approving the sale of certain property located at 160 West Joe Orr Road, Chicago Heights, Illinois (the "Property") owned by the debtor Illinois Topps Realty Corp. ("Realty") to John E. Hancock ("Hancock") for a purchase price of \$725,000.00, or such higher or better offer as this Court may accept.

NOW, upon the order to show cause dated August 13, 1976 the application in support thereof, the order of Judge Cannella dated July 19, 1976 relating hereto and the memorandum and order of Judge Cannella dated August 16, 1976 declining to issue a stay of the July 19th order, and all prior proceedings had herein, and upon the hearing held before the undersigned at which hearing Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. ("Dominick's") appeared and bid,

The Order of Bankruptcy Judge Ryan Dated 9/14/76

and Hancock's assignee, Patrick J. Doyle ("Doyle") appeared and bid, and Doyle having made the best and highest bid of \$1,210,000, and it appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that it is in the best interest of the estate that the sale to Doyle for the price of \$1,210,00 should be approved by this Court, and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is

NOW, on motion of Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, attorneys for the Trustees,

ORDERED, that the Trustees, as Trustees of Realty, are hereby authorized to consummate the sale of the Property to Doyle, for a price of \$1,210,000 substantially on the terms and conditions of the agreement dated August 24, 1976 between Hancock and the Trustees, as Trustees of Realty (the "Contract"), a copy of which is annexed to the aforesaid application as Exhibit "A" with such changes as were stipulated in the record, and with such further changes therein, except for any decrease in the price, as said Trustees shall approve; and it is further

ORDERED, that said closing shall occur on September

16, 1976 (or such later date as the parties may agree in writing)

at such time and place as Doyle and the Trustees shall agree, notwithstanding the pending appeal by Dominick's of the aforesaid

decision of Judge Cannella or anything in the contract to the

contrary; and it is further

ORDERED, that all liens and security interests against

any of the Property (except permitted encumbrances), be and the same hereby are transferred to the proceeds of the sale with the same force and effect as they had when attached to the Property; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Trustees, as Trustees of Realty, be and they hereby are authorized to reject the lease dated May 21, 1961 between Bonobest Development Corporation, the predecessor in interest of Realty and the Decatur Dry Goods Company, predecessor of the debtor Topps of Chicago Heights, Inc.; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Trustees be and they hereby are authorized to take all actions and execute all documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the aforementioned agreement and of the within order.

United States of America Southern District of New York) 53

I, JOHN J. GALGAY, Broke plry Judge, in and for the said direct, do vereby certify that the within Instrume." is a tile and correct copy of the original as the same apac is of record in the office. Received thereing set my hand this

THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE 9/10/76 HEARING BEFORE BANKRUPTCY JUDGE RYAN

1 !	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUPT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (In Bankruptcy)
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1	In the Matter :
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б	-of- : 74 B 614-802
7	INTERSTATE STORES, INC., et al., :
8	Debtors :
9	
	United States Courthouse
10	Foley Square New York, N. Y.
11	September 10, 1976
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13	
14	Before:
15	HONORABLE EDWARD J. RYAN, Bankruptcy Judge
16	
10	The second secon
17	HEARING TO CONSIDER OFFER TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY at CHICAGO HEIGHTS, ILLINOIS
18	
19	
20	APPEARANCES:
21	MESSRS. SHEA, GOULD, KRAMER & CASEY Attorneys for Trustees
	BY: LESTER YASSKY, ESQ.
22	GILBERT ROTKIN, ESQ., PHILIP MANN, ESQ.,
23	Of Counsel
24	Original and the control of the cont
25	GERALD I. METZ, C.S.R. OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

APPEARANCES (continued):

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"1

MESCRS. COLENPACH & DARFILL.
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JOSEPH SAMET, ESQ.

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26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York

MESSES. ZALKIN, RODIN & GOODMAN
Attorneys for Institutional Bank Creditors
EY: BURTON ARONSON, ESQ.,
Of Counsel
750 Third Avenue
New York, New York

MR. YASSKY: We have on this morning the latest episode in the continuing maga of selling the property in Chicago Heights, Illinois.

I would like to hand up an affidavit of

sale and also a certificate of publication of the notice of the hearing today and sale.

THE COURT: So the notice has been given as required by Judge Cannella; is that correct?

MR. YASSKY: Yes, it has.

Your Monor is fully familiar with
the background of this matter. We have on
now for the second time an application of
the trustees to sell this property in
Chicago Heights. Judge Cannella has remanded
the matter to your Honor for further
proceedings and we have again noticed a
sale to approve a contract to Mr. Hancock
for the price of \$725,000 or any higher
offers that this Court will entertain.

I understand that counsel for Dominick's has requested an adjournment of this matter, and I would defer the application at this time to give him an opportunity to be heard.

THE COURT: Surely.

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MR. SILVERMAN: Your Monor, on Wednesday of this week our firm sent letters to all parties who have appeared, filed notices of appearance in this matter, stating that this morning we would make application for an adjournment.

and up a copy of the letter.

THE COURT: It isn't necessary, but if you wish to have it marked as Dominick's Exhibit 1 of today's date, is there any objection to it being received in evidence?

MR. YASSKY: No, sir.

MR. LOWE: No objection.

(Letter marked Dominick's Exhibit 1 in evidence.)

MR. SILVERMAN: As your Honor knows, Dominick's was the successful bidder the first time around. The approval of the sale of the property to my client, Dominick's, was vacated by Judge Cannella, and my client has taken an appeal to the Second Circuit from Judge Cannella's order.

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The way matters now stand, Judge Cannella has stated in a decision dated August 16, 1976, that "if the Court of Appeals determines that this Court's order should be reversed, it may direct that the sale as confirmed by Judge Ryan on May 24, 1976, he reinstated. The Court, therefore, does not believe that Dominick's will be prejudiced by the lack of a stay or that the consummation of a sale will taxto the deal."

this proceeding today should be had, to permit the appeal to go forward, because, as things now stand, if the Court of Appeals should reverse Judge Cannella, the prior decision of this Court of May 24, 1976, approving the prior sale, will be reinstated and whomever would be the purchaser today if the sale were to go forward today would be ousted. There is a second problem. In view of this order of Judge Cannella, the order -- contract that has been proposed by Mr. Hancock has no meaning because the contract requires

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the seller, the trustees, to deliver marketable title.

In view of the order of Judge Cannella, there can be no delivery of marketable title until the appeal is determined and only if the appeal is determined adversely to Dominick's.

We do not believe that a substantial adjournment would be necessary because the Second Circuit has accelerated the appeal and we received a second order, scheduling order that requires us to file our briefs on September 22nd, the other side to file its brief on October first, and the appeal to be argued during the week of October 12.

So that we have but 12 days to get our own briefs and appendix into the Court and the appeal will be, I'm certain, determined relatively soon after October 12 in view of the acceleration of the argument and briefing schedule.

I think that the main reason for not going forward today, therefore, is to clear the state of title by determining what

happens on appeal, to prevent a situation from developing where Mr. Hancock's offer is more than just an offer in the breeze, which it is now. He could walk away tomorrow, in view of the status of title at this time, and to let the dust settle and to prevent the trustees from, in effect, getting what will only be a bottle of jelly. He could have a contract approved today which really means nothing to the trustees.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard, Mr. Yassky?

MR. YASSKY: We oppose the application for adjournment.

THE COURT: In effect, by granting an adjournment I would be overruling Judge Cannella by, in effect, giving a stay; is that your position?

MR. YASSKY: That is certainly the main point.

THE COURT: It seems to be selfevident, and I assume -- now, what else?

MR. YASSKY: I intended to point that out and I won't reiterate it because

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the decision starts out by declining to issue the stay.

THE COURT: Let me point out that even though you indicated I am fully familiar with this matter, I am familiar with what happened before me and Judge Cannella's first decision.

I was not shown a copy of that order on the application for a stay, but if you will, continue.

MR. SILVERMAN: Should we mark that as an exhibit, your Honor?

THE COURT: No, it isn't necessary, counselor. It's part of the record.

MR. YASSKY: I just want to point out several aspects. The estate can be prejudiced here by further delay. They are running costs --

THE COURT: I don't think we need go any further than the fact that, in my opinion, legally, if I were to grant an adjournment of this application, in effect I would be overruling Judge Cannella's denial of a stay for whatever reason he stated.

Let me ask you this: is it clear to the trustee that the trustee is of the opinion that if the Court of Appeals shall reverse Judge Cannella, the offer today shall then become make and academic?

MR. YASSKY: If we have closed before there is a decision --

THE COURT: What's your closing date?

MR. YASSKY: We would close as soon
as practicable after the Court approves
the sale today. There is an outside date
of December 1, but that was only an
outside date for all possible contingencies.

THE COURT: I assume the trustee does not expect to close within 48 hours.

I doubt he intends to close within a week.

I assume the trustee has some target date in mind which has been discussed with Dominick's. Is that so?

MR. YASSKY: The contract is now with Hancock, your Honor, and if they are the successful bidders today, we would be prepared to close within a week.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. LOWE: If your Honor pleases,
my firm represents Hancock, and I join in
the trustees' application that the sale
proceed today.

THE COURT: I have already denied the application for a stay, so I don't see any need to join in the trustees' application that it go forward. I have already said that the sale will go forward.

But is there any question that

Judge Cannella's statement is the understanding
of the parties, that if his decision

reversing my order approving the offer of

Dominick's is reversed, then what goes on
here today shall become a nullity?

MR. LOWE: I am not quite sure. I don't read Judge Cannella's decision that way.

THE COURT: All right, that's the state of the record, gentlemen. Now does anyone else wish to be heard before we inquire whether anybody else wishes to make a higher or better offer.

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. I

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1 would like to request that the Court 3 inquire of Mr. Mancock two things. First, 4 who is Mr. Hancock bidding for? And, second, 5 I would appreciate the Court asking 6 Mr. Hancock to represent that he is not 7 acting directly or indirectly for AMP, Inc., 8 nor does he intend nor has he had 9 discussions to sell the property to AMF, Inc., 10 or any affiliate or subsidiary thereof. 11 The reason why I make this request, 12 your Honor, is that AMF has entered this 13 proceeding ostensibly as an independent creditor who stands in shoes different from 14 15 Mr. Hancock and asserts certain positions that Mr. Hancock is not permitted to assert, 16 and I would like to know that Mr. Hancock is 17 not acting in fact for AMF or an affiliate 18 or subsidiary or in connection with AMF. 19 20 MR. LOWE: I would object to such 21 a request. .).)

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THE COURT: It's totally irrelevant. MR. LOUM: It's not even relevant. It's wholly inappropriate.

THE COURT: I am at a loss to understand

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what it has to do with what I have before me.

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You may remember, at the earlier hearing I characterized the position taken by AMF as being a tool so as to give status on an appeal for the claimed want of proper notice. As I recall Judge Cannella's decision, though, that wasn't discussed at all. So I'm at a loss to understand how AMF's status or lack of status has anything to do with what's before me today.

MR. SILVERMAN: I think, your Honor, for purposes of the appeal the record ought to be clear as to what the position of AMF and Mr. Hancock is.

THE COURT: Now that clarifies it. I'm not going to use this hearing on an offer as a means of amplifying the record for purposes of the appeal from the order of Judge Cannella. So let's get on with the business at hand.

You rise, Mr. Yassky. Do you wish to be heard?

MR. YASSKY: Only that it's our application, your Fenor.

THE COURT: Does anybody wish to make a higher or better offer than the offer of John Hancock?

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Dominick's is prepared to make a better offer, and we do so under the following condition: all offers that Dominick's submits this morning are submitted under protest and without waiving any rights on appeal and we do so under a doctrine set forth in the case of Gil-bern Industries, Inc., a First Circuit case appearing at 526 Fed. 2d, 267, decided December 4, 1975. That was a situation in which a bidder obtained the property the first time around; he was required to go to a second round of hidding. He obtained the property the second time around. He still perfected his appeal, and the Court held that was entitled to the lower price.

So that we submit all bids and all offers this morning on the understanding that we do it under protest and without waiving any rights on our appeal.

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THE COUPT: All right, how much do you bid?

MR. SILVERIOUS With that understanding, we are prepared to bid the same price on what we consider to be a better offer. The Hancock contract contains several conditions which, if not met by the seller, permits the buyer to walk away. One condition that appears in paragraphs 4.1(b) and 5.1 and 5.2 of the contract is that the seller must deliver marketable title with certain permitted exceptions.

outs based on marketability. We were completely satisfied with the state of title four months ago at the last time that a title report was received. If nothing has happened since that time and if title is delivered to us in the state that it was four months ago, not counting Judge Cannella's order because we would consider that a permitted exception, we would accept title as it then was, it simply being understood that the trustees

2 will take care of franchise taxes. In other words, we offer a bid which 3 in this respect is better because we do not seek marketable title and we seek no outs based on marketable title. If the state of title is the same as it was four months aco and the trustee pays the franchise taxes, which he is required to do in any event, 9 we take the title in the state it then 10 11 was. THE COURT: As you read your report 12 as it was four months ago, would marketable 13 title be able to be delivered? 14 MR. SILVERMAN: No. 15 THE COURT: What would render title 16 unmarketable four months ago? 17 MR. SILVERMAN: There are various 18 restrictions and encumbrances and 19 restrictive covenants and liens. We are 20 21 it was --3.3 23

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prepared to take it in the state that THE COURT: Is Dominick's prepared to take it subject to the state of the title as it appeared -- pardon me. Is Hancock

	Before Bankruptcy Judge Ryan
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2	prepared to accept it subject to what
3	appears in that title report of four months
.1	ago, Mr. Lowe?
5	Off the record.
6	(Discussion off the record)
7	MR. LOWE: May I respectfully request
8	a few moments, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Certainly.
10	MR. SILVERMAN: We have other things,
11	also.
12	THE COURT: Let's try to get rid of
13	them one at a time.
14	MR. LONE: May I have a few moments?
15	THE COURT: Will you need a few
16	minutes?
17	MR.LOWE: About five minutes.
18	THE COURT: Off the record.
19	(Discussion off the record)
20	THE COURT: If you will state succinctly
21	what the other phases of your offer are
22	that render it a better offer.
23	MR. SILVERMAN: In paragraphs 4.1(c)
21	and 7.1(d) of the contract, the seller has
25	to deliver certain letters from the

Insurance Company. We do not know whether
the seller can obtain those latters from
Massachusetts Mutual if Hancock is the
huyer. We do represent to this Court that
the seller can have no difficulty in obtaining
those letters from Massachusetts Mutual if
the buyer is Dominick's. We have been in
touch with Massachusetts Mutual.

frivolous. If necessary, the trustee can subpoena Massachusetts Mutual in here, put them under oath and require that they state the amount of the mortgage. I think that we are bordering on the frivolous with that.

What's the third one?

MR. SILVERMAN: They would have to consent to the transaction. The contract requires Massachusetts Mutual to consent to this transaction, your Honor. That's stated in the contract. We know that we can get that consent, that the trustees can get it if we are the buyer. We don't know

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2 that about Mr. Hancock. 3 Thirdly --1 THE COURT: I thought that was thir ly. ., MR. SILVIR'AN: No. That was second. 6 THE COUNT: Your first one was that marketability --MR. SILVERMAN: First was marketability. 9 Second was the letters from the mortgagee. 10 THE COURT: That's a two-pronged 11 approach. 12 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes. Third is that in paragraph 4.1(d) the seller is required 13 to deliver a waiver from a licensee on the 14 15 property that runs a gas station known as Di-Gas, a waiver that the licenses waives 16 17 his right to terminate the Di-Gas license agreement and waives his right to require 18 the licensor to purchase the licensee's 19 20 property. We are prepared to waive paragraph 4.1(d) in its entirety. 21 THE COURT: You would take it, then, 22 23 subject to the rights of Di-Gas without requiring a waiver from them; is that correct? 24

IR. SILVERMAN: That's co-rect.

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THE COUPT: All right. Anything else at the present time?

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MR. SIMPLYAN: In parcaraph 23, the closing must occur, in any event, by December first under the agreement with Hancock. We would be prepared to extend that date to January 15th.

MR. LOWE: How is that an improvement, your Honor?

THE COURT: Please, Mr. Lowe.

MR. LOWE: I'm sorry.

MR. SILVERMAN: I emphasize, your
Honor, that even if we were not to offer
these changes in the contract which makes
our offer, we believe, a better offer, we
believe our offer is better, in any event,
because of the problem of there being a
cloud on title by virtue of the appeal
does not exist were we to win the appeal
or lose the appeal. Our client would be
in possession of the property, and a
transaction would not have to be undone.

THE COURT: That's a bootstrap argument, and I will ask you, do you have

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any other phases of your offer that you say are more attractive for the trustees?

MR. SILVERYAN: No, your Fonor. At this time we would match the price with those conditions.

THE COURT: At this time we will give a short adjournment to the trustees to digest what you have said, for Hancock to digest what you have said, and before we take the five-minute adjournment, does any other person here in Court wish to participate in the bidding for the property that's the subject matter of this hearing?

A VOICE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You being who, sir?

MR. LOWE: May I make just a statement for the record, if counsel will excuse me.

If Your Honor pleases, I would respectfully object to the imposition of any conditions at this stage of the hearing or sale. The stay was denied by Judge Cannella on August --

THE COURT: What conditions are you talking about? The man argues that he was

invited here to make a higher or, in the alternative, a better offer. We says he has four points. We said five, but the fifth one, I don't even consider. Four points that show that his is a better offer. I suggested to you, you night cant five minutes to digest what he says so you can argue to me that it's not a better offer.

MR. IONE: All right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now you, sir, did you indicate that you wished to make a further offer?

You represent whom, sir?

MR. BERNFIELD: My name is Glen Bernfield and I'm from the Chicago law firm of Panter, Nelson and Bernfield, and I represent Mr. Patrick J. Doyle. Mr. Doyle has an assignment of Mr. Hancock's rights under this contract, and we are prepared to bid further in the event it is necessary on behalf of --

MR. BURNFIELD: Right, that's correct, and Mr. Doyle is here in the courtroom, your

Honor.

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MR. SIEVERMAN: Do we have any indication as to Mr. Doyle's financial responsibility?

There is an indication in the record, as it stands, considering what went on in May, of Dominick's financial responsibility.

MR. LOWE: I think we can deal with that at the appropriate time, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, we can. I would simply like to hear argument on whether these four suggestions of counsel for Dominick's makes it a better offer.

MR. LOWE: May I be heard just one second?

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. LOWE: You have had a statement from counsel that he is prepared to bid more than \$725,000.

THE COURT: He is playing his cards one at a time. Fe doesn't want to show the whole hand at once. He can't be criticized for that.

MR. LOWE: If we get a better dollar offer, does it make any sense to go into the conditions?

dollar offer. I hear what he says is a better offer. I would like to hear from the trustee and from you whether you agree it's a better offer, and if you don't think it's a better offer, tell me why.

MR. LOWF: We will have a better dollar offer, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to make a better dollar offer now?

MR. LOWE: Do I understand that you don't intend to put in any better or higher dollar bid?

MR. SILVERMAN: That is an incorrect understanding.

THE COURT: It is implicit from what has been said so far this morning. I want to hear arguments and I will make a decision now on the question whether counsel for Dominick's has just made a better offer.

MR. LOWE: Thank you.

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(A recess was taken)

(Hearing remined at 10:25 a.m.)

MR. YASSKY: The trustee wishes to advise the Court that in our judgment the offer of Dominick's to purchase at the same price as the Hancock contract is a better offer from the estate's standpoint, primarily for the reason of the waiver of the Di-Gas matter. There is a potential claim against the estate if Di-Gas would choose to exercise its rights under its license and that is a value, if not presently ascertainable. Certainly in the trustee's judgment he has considered it a value and would make the offer better than certainly a similar offer at another price.

MR. LOWF: Before deferring to counsel for the assignee, I think it encumbent upon me to bring to the attention of the trustee --

THE COURT: Who is going to speak for the person who is bidding against Dominick's, you or the other gentleman?

MR. IOWN: The other gentleman.

MR. LOVE: I do speak for whom, then?

MR. LOVE: I do speak for "r. Hancock
and I think I have a statement that I would
like to make on his hebalf.

TEF COUNT: Mr. Mancock has assigned his rights to this gentleman's client.

MR. IOWE: That is correct.

THE COURT: Those are the two parties in interest.

MR. YASSKY: We would want to make one point on the same assignment question because it's germane to what your Monor has just been speaking to.

THE COURT: We don't come to that,
though, unless they are able to persuade
me that the Dominick's offer is not a better
offer.

MR. YASSKY: All right.

MR. IOWE: I will defer to counsel for the assignee.

THE COURT: Are you prepared to mest Deminick's terms?

MR. BERNFFID: Ves we are, your Foror. In the sense that the trustee and

Mr. Yassky have indicated that the valver of the Di-Gas condition is a better offer, we are prepared to waive that particular condition.

THE COURT: Do you also waive the condition of markstability?

MR. BERNFIELD: Yes.

THE COURT: And are you prepared to accept the title as it existed at the time that Dominick's had their title search four months ago?

MR. BERNFIELD: What was that date?

If I'm aware of that date.

As a matter of fact, we are prepared to accept the title as it existed on May 5, 1976, which is the date of the title report which --

THE COURT: You reserved anything that took place in the intervening period.

MR. SILVERMAN: Except one thing which
we didn't reserve and we are prepared to
waive that effect on marketability. We
would not assert as an effect on marketability,
as destroying marketability, the pendency
of the appeal or the order of Judge Cannella.

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THE COURT: Yes, and I say that's a bootstrap and that is not even to be given consideration at the present time.

MR. SILVERMAN: May I just be heard on that point.

As matters now stand, if there were to be a closing with Mr. Mancock set up, he could assert the Judge Cannella order as saying there can be no marketability and walk away.

MR. YASSKY: The trustees would insist on that waiver.

THE COURT: I assume that's implicit.

MR. YASSKY: I would like it to be explicit on the record that Hancock would not assert the pending appeal as a cloud on the title.

MR. BERNTIFID: So long as there is no stay, I think that's acceptable.

MR. YASSKY: With the present state of the record.

MR. BERNFIELD: As the record now stands, yes.

TER COURT: What about obtaining consent

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of Massachusetts Mutual?

MR. PERMITIELD: We have no objection to that, your Monor.

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We will waive that requirement. I think Massachusetts Mutual must consent.

THE COURT: Even if they con't, you are prepared to go forward without their consent?

MR. PERNETELD: Yes.

THE COURT: We now have a Mexican standoff.

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, on this question of title, I would just like to ask whether Mr. Doyle said he would waive the pendency of the appeal as a condition? Is he prepared to say that he would close tomorrow or next week or the week after and pay the \$725,000 and if the sale were set aside in the Court of Appeals, he gets nothing back? Because he took the state of title that existed and waived the pendency of the appeal as a condition.

THE COURT: Are you telling me if Deminick's prevails on the appeal, they

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are not going to go forward at their --

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MP. SILWERMAN: Dominick's, of course, will go forward. Dominick's will certainly go forward. The muestion is whether Hr. Doyle would be prepared to say that he is willing to pay \$725,000 for the right to perhaps remain in possession for a month and a half. That's what he's saying.

THE COURT: That is of no concern to Dominick's. That's of concern to the trustees.

All right, so we have a standoff, then, gentlemen.

Does anybody wish to make a higher or better offer?

MR. LOWE: May I be heard at this point? I would like to be heard.

THE COURT: I don't think it's fair to have two attorneys acting for the one interest, but go right ahead, Mr. Lowe.

MR. LOWF: If your Honor pleases,

I would like to make a statement to the

Court that I think should be brought to the

attention of the Court and the trustee.

I am informed by Mr. Hancock that
three weeks ago he was approached indirectly
by a representative of Dominich's and
requested not to make any higher offer to
this Court for the one—that was submitted.

THE COURT: What does this have to do with anything that I have before me?

MR. LOWD: I think it places this hearing in the appropriate context, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are we supposed to conduct a grand jury investigation, or have a simple commercial matter proceed as it ought proceed?

As I understand it, then, we have Dominick's counter-offer, which was better than the original offer of the assignee of Hancock. Hancock has met the Dominick's offer. Do you wish to make a higher or better offer?

MR. SILVERMAN: \$730,000, on those terms.

MR. PERNFIELD: We would request that in view of the magnitude of the sale here, that

	Before Bankraptey badge ngan
1	3
2	the increments be increments of \$25,000.
3	THE COURT: No. They will be \$10,000.
4	MR. HERETIETH: I take it there is
5	still Mr. Hancock's contract of \$725,000.
6	TUD COUPT: 0730,000 has been bid.
7	You may increase it in increments of
8	\$10,000 if you wish.
9	MR. EFFIFIFID: Mr. Doyle will be
10	doing the bidding on this.
11	MR. DOYLE: \$740,000.
12	MR. STLVFRMAN: \$750,000.
13	MR. DOYLE: \$760,000.
14	MR. SILVERMAN: \$770,000.
15	MR. DOYLE: \$780,000.
16	MR. SILVERMAN: \$790,000.
17	MR. DOYLE: \$800,000.
18	MR. SILVERMAN: \$810,000.
19	MR. DOYLE: \$820,000.
20	MR. SILVERMI: \$830,000.
21	MR. DOYLE: \$840,000.
22	MR. SILVEPMAN: \$850,000.
23	MR. DOYLE: \$860,000.
24	MR. SILVEPEDN: \$870,000.
25	MR. DOYLE: \$830,000.

	Before Bankruptcy Judge Ryan	
1		32
2	MR. SILVERYAN: \$890,000.	
3	MR. DOYLE: 5000,000.	
4	אש. נון און מון מון מון מון מון מון מון מון מון מ	
5	MR. DOYLE: 5920,000.	
6	MR. STINEDURN: 5030,000.	
7	MR. FOYIF: \$940,000.	
8	MR. STINTPYAN: \$950,000.	
9	MR. DOYLE: \$960,000.	
10	MR. SILVERMAN: \$970,000.	
11	MR. DOYLE: \$980,000.	
12	MR. SILVERMAN: \$990,000.	
13	MR. DOYLE: \$1 million.	
14	MR. SILVERMAN: \$1,010,000.	
15	MR. DOYLE: \$1,020,000.	
16	MR. SILVERMAN: \$1,030,000.	
17	MR. DOYLE: \$1,040,000.	
18	MR. SILVERMAN: \$1,050,000.	
19	MR. DOYLE: \$1,060,000.	
20	MR. SILVFRMAN: \$1,070,000.	
21	MR. DOYLE: \$1,080,000.	
22	MR. SILVERMAN: \$1,090,000.	
23	MR. DOYLF: \$1.1 million.	
24	MR. SILVERWAN: Your Honor, at this	
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point could we have some indication as to

1 33 the bidder's financial responsibility, 3 Mr. Poylo's financial remonsibility. 1 TUT com T: bood the tracker ack for some evidence of that? 6 MR. YASSTY: To would like some 7 indication of that because with the bidding 8 being --9 THE COURT: I would point out that I 10 have highly spirited bidding. It hardly 11 seems the appropriate time to let things 12 cool down. You have not \$1.1 million. I 13 don't think we can do a D&B on the man in 14 five minutes. 15 MR. YASSKY: One of the terms in 16 the notice was the ten percent down. 17 MR. DOYLE: I have certified checks for \$150,000. 18 19 THE REPORTED: May I have your full 20 name. MR. POYLE: Patrick John Michael Doyle. 21 THE COURT: \$1.1 million. 90 23 MR. SILVIP AY: \$1.15 million. 21 MP. DOVIE - \$1,160,000. 25

"R. SILVET" W: \$1,170,000.

21

25

MR. DOYLE: \$1,180,000.

". SILM "" 51,190,000.

MR. DOVEE: 62 million -- no. \$1.2 million, your Fonor.

MR. SILVERYOU: We makeh \$1.2 million.

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We don't exceed that, and we state that the offer at \$1.2 million is a better offer because of the likelihood of the proceeding being brought to a final close and nobody being custed of possession and the transaction not being undone.

MR. DOYLE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Please, Mr. Doyle.

MR. YASSKY: Can I ask a question.

Does that mean that the preservation of the rights on appeal are now being waived?

HR. SILVERMAN: NO.

THE COURT: No.

I think that the final highest bid was made by Mr. Doyle, \$1.2 million.

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, may I inquire why the equal bid of Dominick's would not be inherently a better bid?

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

MR. EFRNFICLD: I think that would be mute --

We have bidding that went up to \$1.2 million. You don't better it. He made the last offer. By just repeating his offer, you don't better it. He hid \$1.2 million on the amendment to the conditions as were spelled out by you. He made the final high bid of \$1.2 million.

MR. SILVERMAN: We believe, your
Honor, that if we match that bid, it's not
a higher bid, but it is a better bid. It is
inherently better for the trustees to
accept the same bid of Dominick's because
of problems which obviously are obviated
that do exist if the offer of Hancock were
accepted at the same price.

MR. YASSKY: Your Monor, if I could point out to the Court --

THE COURT: Just a minute. I think

we are now up in the realm of philosophy.

As I understand counsel's argument, it's

a better offer because even though dollar-vise

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The Transcript of the 9/10/76 Hearing Before Bankruptcy Judge Ryan 1 36 it's the same, it releases the estate of the potentiality that there might be a reversal by the Court of Appeals. MR. YASSUY: I would aroue just --THE COURT TO. I funt state that this is what I understood to to his argument. I'm not giving a decision on it. 9 MR. ETHIPTEID: Is that Dominick's 10 final offer? 11 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes. 12 MR. BERNFIELD: We understand that you have accepted our offer as being the 13 final offer, as being the higher offer. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 15 16 MR. BERNFIFID: In the event there is any problem with that, we would be 17 prepared to go to \$1,210,000. However, 18 if that is not necessary, we will accept 19 the higher offer, \$1.2 million. 20 THE COURT: You continue the bid 21 of \$1.2 million? •) •) 23 MR. BERMTITLD: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Your final bid is \$1.2 million?

MF. DOVIT: \$1.21, unconditional,

\$1,210,000.

saving that it's a better offer.

amounts involved, your Pener, if we could just take two minutes of your Fener's time and stipulate on the record the conditions as I understand them, and that is that --

THE COURT: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

of Dominick's at \$1.2 million is not a better offer than the \$1.21 million. I reject Dominick's argument that it is a better offer, because if Dominick's offer is accepted, that will obviate any of the problems that inhere in the pendency of the appeal in the Second Circuit.

Now, Mr. Yassky, if you want to summarize for the record what the trustees understand are the conditions under which Mr. Povic's interests are offering \$1.21 million.

TR. YACCEY: Yen. To would like

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The contract is with Mr. Pancock and provides that there shall be no accidement unless a duplicate original containing an assumption by the accidence is delivered to the seller. We have never received that. But we will be willing to accept the representation on the record that there is an assumption of the contract as it stands with, of course, the higher price that's accepted.

assignment that Mr. Mancock does assume and which Mr. Doyle has accepted and I will deliver it. I believe the contract calls for duplicates and here they are. Let me make certain.

MR. YASSKY: It is also understood that Mr. Doyle will waive the condition with respect to Di-Gas.

MR. BEPNFIFID: Ves.

MR. YASSKY: It is also understood that Mr. Doyle accepts the title report as then delivered to you in May with the exceptions not different.

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21 25 MR. DUDIFFIELD: Yes, except with the exception of the lease provision, for which we have an order that will be entered today that rejects that 1961 lease.

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MR. Vicery: That's acceptable.

It is also understood that you will not assert as a cloud on the title, and you accept the title to be marketable, notwithstanding the present status of the appeal by Dominick's of the order of Judge Cannella?

MR. BEPTFIFID: Yes.

THE COUPT: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. YXSEKY: It is understood that
Mr. Doyle will waive the condition with
respect to Massachusetts Mutual that
Massachusetts Mutual is required to
consent to the transaction?

MR. PERMFIELD: Yes.

MR. MASSKY: It is also understood that a further down-payment will be delivered to the trustees this morning.

ing. prominger p. vog.

1 40 MR. YASSKY: In the amount of 10 percent 3 of the cash amount of the purchase price. 1 Mo. Torritor nicht. TWO COUNT: From that wrap it up? ID. Windy. my t vraps it up. THE COURS: 111 right, gentlemen, 8 you may submit an appropriate order. 9 Incidentally, does the Commission 10 wish to express anything on this, Ms. Wiener? 11 MS. UTTITER: No. 12 MR. PERTIELD: We would like to 13 submit an order this morning. We would like 14 to have "r. Yassky look at it first, but 15 we can expedite the closing if we can have 16 an order entered immediately. 17 MR. MANN: We have to give two days' 18 notice to Judge Cannella under the order 19 of reference for orders of this nature. 20 So I'm afraid we cannot expedite it all 21 that much. 22 MR. YASSYY: We will look at it.

(The matter was closed)

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THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY DOMINICK'S IN SUPPORT OF A MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL, DATED 8/13/76

UNITED	ST	ATES	DIS	TRI	CT	CC	DURT
SOUTHER							

In re

INTERSTATE STORES, INC., formerly known as INTERSTATE DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al.,

Reorganization Nos. 74B 614-802 Inclusive

Debtors.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Upon the annexed affidavit of Arthur C. Silverman, sworn to August 13, 1976, with annexed exhibits and all the proceedings had herein;

LET John E. Hancock, AMF Inc. and Joseph R. Crowley and Herbert B. Siegel as Trustees of Illinois Topps Realty Corp., or their attorneys, show cause before this Court at Room of the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, New York, New York, on August , 1976 at or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why an order should not be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 8: staying the order of this Court of July 20, 1976 vacating the May 24, 1976 order of Bankruptcy Judge Ryan authorizing the said Trustees to consummate the sale of certain real property located in Chicago Heights, Illinois, or in the alternative, enjoining the said Trustees from entering into any transaction to dispose of the aforesaid real property, pending prompt prosecution of the appeal by Dominick's Finer Food, Inc. to

the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and it is further

ORDERED, that pending the hearing of this motion, the Trustees shall take no steps in furtherance of any transaction to dispose of the subject real property.

Service of a copy of this order and the papers
upon which it was granted shall be sufficient if made personally
upon the attorneys for the Trustees on or before August ,

1976, and if made by mail on or before August , 1976 upon
the attorneys who have received notice of the various proceedings
heretofore had herein.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Reorganization Nos. 74B 614-802 Inclusive

In re

INTERSTATE STORES, INC., formerly known as INTERSTATE DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al.,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL

Debtors.

State of New York)
ss.:
County of New York)

Arthur C. Silverman, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

Barell, attorneys for Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. ("Dominick's") which has appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from this Court's order of July 20, 1976 vacating two orders of Bankruptcy Judge Ryan. Judge Ryan's first order, signed May 24, 1976 authorized the consummation of the sale of certain real property located in Chicago Heights, Illinois (the "Property") by Illinois Topps Realty Corp. to Dominick's pursuant to a contract previously authorized by the Bankruptcy Court on May 17. Judge Ryan's second order, was orally issued on June 28, 1976, after evidentiary hearing, and denied a motion brought by AMF, Inc. (a creditor) and John E. Hancock (a bidder for the property) to vacate and set aside the prior May 24 order.

- 2. I submit this affidavit in support of Dominick's motion pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure: to enjoin the Trustees from entering into any transaction to sell the Property, or in the alternative, to stay this Court's vacatur order, filed July 20, 1976, pending appeal as of right by Dominick's from said vacatur order pursuant to Section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §47).
- 3. This motion is brought on by order to show cause because an interim stay pending hearing of this motion is being sought. On August 11, I was informed by Lester Yassky, Esq. of the law firm representing the Trustees that it is his intention to immediately execute (either today or early next week) a contract to sell the Property to Hancock for \$725,000 subject to Bankruptcy Court approval. As will be made clear below, if the interim relief and the relief pending appeal are not granted, Dominick's will be irreparably harmed, will have no alternative relief, and its appeal will be rendered moot. In contrast if said relief is granted, neither Hancock nor the Trustees nor the creditors will suffer any substantial harm if Dominick's is permitted to pursue diligently and expeditiously its right of appeal -an appeal which we believe raises for the first time in a Court of Appeals important questions concerning: (i) the nature and scope of notices of hearing for the sale of

property under the recently promulgated Chapter X Bankruptcy Rules, and (ii) the discretion of the Bankruptcy Judge in approving notices addressed to a limited class of recipients. These issues are of paramount importance in the day-to-day administration of the estates of debtors and bankrupts.

- 4. A notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was filed by Dominick's on August 12, 1976, and a copy thereof is annexed hereto as Exhibit A.
- 5. The need for relief pending appeal is obvious and Dominick's will be severely prejudiced unless such relief is immediately granted, for if a contract is signed by the Trustees and Hancock, Dominick's will be compelled either to abandon any interest in the property or to better Hancock's offer. In either event the appeal would become moot and Dominick's would thus forfeit the right of appeal and all its rights under the prior contract between Dominick's and the Trustees. Similarly, in either event, Dominick's will be irreparably harmed, for it must choose between giving up all rights to the Property and giving up for all time (without recourse against anyone) the advantageous terms set forth in the contract between Dominick's and the Trustees. One obvious benefit to Dominick's is the \$685,000 price which is \$40,000 less than the \$725,000 bid of Hancock. In short, if relief is not granted and the appeal is permitted

to proceed, Dominick's must necessarily lose the fruits of its good faith contract with the Trustees. See generally 6 Moores Federal Practice, ¶ 57.13 (2d ed. 1966).

- appeal which it should be permitted to prosecute. This

 Court,in vacating Judge Ryan's order, suggested that on

 remand: (1) the Trustees' Notice of Hearing, issued pursuant

 to Bankruptcy Rule 10-607, indicate that alternative offers

 will be entertained on or before the return date, and (2)

 pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 10-209(b)(4), that 20 days'

 notice of proposed sales of property be given to creditors,

 stockholders, indenture trustees, and others, except to the

 extent that the Trustee can show cause why such notice is

 not required. Indeed the Court suggested that advertising

 in national newspapers might be required.
- as to the amount of discretion which a Bahkruptcy Judge may exercise under Bankruptcy Rules 10-607 and 10-209(b)(4).

 Although this Court clearly disagrees with the Bankruptcy Judge, there has to date been no definitive authority, case law or statutory, compelling the Bankruptcy Judge to exercise its discretion in a manner apparently required by this Court.
 - (b) The evidence strongly demonstrates, in

the view of Dominick's, that Judge Ryan exercised his discretion properly, carefully, and judiciously, and that his interpretation of the governing Bankruptcy Rules was eminently reasonable, especially in light of the following facts:

- i) there was no complaint by Hancock, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Unofficial Creditors' Committee or the Senior Institutional Lenders as to the number of creditors who received notice of the hearing or the sufficiency of the notice. The only objectant—who belatedly entered the scene—was a single creditor who, stood to gain only \$40.00 (three one hundreths of one cent per dollar of claim) from Hancock's untimely offer.
- ii) Hancock was advised several times prior to and at the May17th hearing that another party intended to appear and respond to the Hancock offer with a higher price.
- iii) the sale involved only 0.4 percent of the Debtor's total assets.
- iv) The Trustees had demonstrated the required good cause for the shortened period of notice and limited class of recipients ordered by Judge Ryan. The cause shown for shortening the twenty day period was the conditional sales contract between the Trustees and Hancock

which required an accelerated notice period. Relatedly, that contract also provided that in any event the sale had to be completed by June 1. In short it would have been impossible to comply with both the contract time deadline and the twenty day provision of Bankruptcy Rule 10-209(b). Moreover, the cause for limiting the class was made clear, i.e. that the Trustees should not be burdened with sending notice to 9,000 creditors and 7,700 stockholders where the sale of only 0.4% of the debtor's assets was involved.

- (c) Judge Ryan after conducting two hearings and carefully sifting Hancock's claim, concluded that "To set aside this sale would work a travesty of justice in my opinion. Entirely adequate and prior notice was given. . . . It would work a gross injustice to Domonick's if this sale were to be set aside. "June 28, 1976 Tr. at 69-70, guoted in J. Canella's July 19, 1975 opinion at 5-6. (Exhibit B). Surely such a carefully arrived at conclusion must be accorded sufficient significance to warrant a stay so that the Court of Appeals may be allowed to decide issues of critical importance to the daily administration and dispostion of estates in bankruptcy.
- 7. This Court, of course, has the power to grant a stay of its own order pending the determination of an appeal therefrom. See, e.g., Ivor B. Clark Co. v. Hogan,

296 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Indeed the Court should grant such a stay where a denial would render the appeal subject to dismissal on grounds of mootness and where equitable considerations such as irreparable harm to Dominick's and the merits of Dominick's appeal weigh heavily in Hancock's favor. See, In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 346 F. Supp. 1333,1334 (E.D. Pa. 1972);cf. Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1960) (Waterman, J., concurring); Taylor v. Board of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).

8. Dominick's has made no prior application for a motion to stay this Court's order.


Arthur C. Silverman

the C. dilvens

Sworn to before me

this /3/kday of aug., 1976

RONALD S. KATZ Notary Public, State of New York No. 60-407395 Qualified in Westchaster County Term Expires, March 30, 1976



CF-1201 (P.E-53) -

of the with a Affendix smitted this 30TH day of NOVENDER 1 76 the Savelillanthe Lay Attorney; for Deaton - APPRILEAT TRUSTRAS OF INTARSTATE COPY REC'D. KNAUSE MRSCH & GROSS ANN PO DOWN ATTORNOYS FOR APPELLER HANCOUS

> trus cryd wells -ATTORNEYS FOR APPECERA AAF INC.